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1.  INTRODUCTION
In this new era of digital innovations, data plays a pivotal 
role. Owing to the increased use of databases, it has become 
increasingly vulnerable to copyright and piracy threats. With 
this, the need to protect them arises. Technological protection 
methods1 (TPMs) backed by legal anti-circumvention measures 
offer a cost-effective solution to database protection. TPMs 
include the technologies that are used to control access to 
copyright content or to prevent users from copying protected 
content. Watermarking of digital databases is one such TPM 
that has emerged as an effective means to protect shared and 
outsourced data from unauthorized access. 
Robust digital watermarking techniques aim at ownership 
protection. Normally, robust watermarking algorithms introduce 
small changes in the data throughout the database, albeit in 
manner that it does not render the data completely unusable. 
However, there are databases that contain sensitive information 
such as those used in medical and military applications where 
even the slightest distortions cannot be tolerated. In particular, 
categorical data assume a fixed and limited number of values 
and even a small change can lead to a change in category itself. 
It is therefore a challenge to implement robust watermarking in 
a database that contains predominantly categorical data. In this 
paper, authers proposed a distortion-free, robust watermarking 
technique for watermarking categorical attributes to resolve 
ownership verification. 
2. RELATED WORK
Watermarking databases mainly resolves two important 
issues: proof of ownership and tamper detection. A robust 
technique provides ownership proof whereas a fragile 
watermark detects any tamperness in the database. Agrawal2, 
et al. proposed robust watermarking technique to insert marks 
in the numeric attributes. They embedded the watermark by 
resetting the algorithmically determined least significant bit of 
a specific attribute. This technique is not resilient to bit-based 
attacks. Farfoura3, et al. proposed time-stamping protocol to 
resolve additive attacks. The embedding process was reversible 
so that original values can be regained.
Shehab4, et al.  and  Khanduja5, et al. utilized statistical 
properties of the data-set to embed watermark into the numerical 
attribute. They framed watermarking problem as a constrained 
optimization problem and discuss the efficient techniques to 
solve it. Several other notorious works is proposed in literature 
to watermark numeric attributes6-9.
Watermarking in non-numeric attributes requires different 
approach as bit-flipping does not work here10,11. Watermark is 
embedded using non-repetitive nature of occurrence of a vowel 
in a non-numeric attribute value10. A vowel is appended to the 
selected attribute depending upon the key value generated for 
a tuple. 
In robust database watermarking schema, there is an 
underlying assumption that all watermarked attributes can 
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tolerate small perturbations. However, same techniques are 
not applicable in case of categorical attributes. Categorical 
attributes take a finite set of distinct values. Altering their 
values can make the data meaningless.
Sion12, et al. proposed a technique to watermark 
categorical data by modifying their values within allowable 
limits based on watermark. Each watermark bit is embedded 
into selected tuples. Value of the selected attribute is secretly 
changed to value which lies in discrete domain of that attribute. 
For example, the colour of an item may be changed from blue 
to red. Finally, majority voting is used to extract the watermark 
bits correctly.
Apart from robust watermarking techniques, Li13, et al. 
devised a distortion-free fragile watermarking technique in 
which all the tuples in a database relation are divided into 
groups and the watermark is embedded and verified in each 
group independently depending upon group hash values. 
However, this technique is designed for tamper detection and 
does not resolve ownership verification issues. Other distortion 
free techniques proposed in literature include14-16; guo14, et al. 
proposed the technique to embed and verify watermark group 
by group independently according to some secure parameters. 
In this scheme two sets of watermarks are embedded into 
LSb’s of the attributes of a tuple within a group to localize 
modifications made to the database. The core idea of Khan15, 
et al. is to generate watermark based on local characteristics 
of database relation like frequency distribution of digit, length 
and range. 
Camara16, et al. partitions the database into different 
set of square matrices. Watermark is then generated using 
determinant and the minor of the generated square matrix. This 
watermark is not embedded but registered with trusted third 
party for integrity verification. 
The techniques proposed by guo14, et al., Khan15, et al., 
and Camara16, et al. can be used to identify if the database had 
been tampered with but cannot be used to claim ownership 
as the watermark can be easily spiflicated with the slightest 
attack.
In this paper, authors proposed a robust watermarking 
technique for categorical attributes to resolve ownership 
verification. A distortion-free technique is proposed that 
embeds watermarks by changing the positions of tuples 
within the database in a secure manner. Single watermark bit 
is embedded repeatedly into secretly decided partitions. This 
adds security to the algorithm in comparison to the work of Li13 
et al. where two consecutive tuples are compared. Moreover, 
to prove ownership rights, the robust technique is applied in 
contrast to fragile technique of Li13.
3. PROPOSED WATERMARKING TECHNIQUE
The proposed watermarking system consists of two 
subsystems: the Watermark Encoder and its corresponding 
Decoder. Suppose R is a relation whose schema is 
R(A0, A1,....,ANa-1). There are Nt number of tuples in R and Na 
is number of attributes in relation R. Na includes categorical 
attributes such as social security number, gender, etc.
3.1 Watermark Encoder
The watermark dncoder first prepares and then embeds 
the prepared watermark into the database R as shown in 
Fig. 1. It shows the flow of information through four phases 
of encoder.
Figure 1. Block diagram of watermark encoder.
3.1.1 Prepare Watermark 
This phase securely prepares the watermark. Watermark w 
is first selected by owner of the database reflecting the owner’s 
identity in some unique way. This watermark is made secure by 
generating a playfair cipher17using secret key Ks. The playfair 
cipher possesses distinct secure characteristics. Firstly, the 
cipher, being digraph, destroys single-letter frequencies. The 
monographic analysis of frequencies is destroyed. Secondly, 
for smaller data as required in our application, it is almost 
infeasible to break the code. Digraph ciphers halve the number 
of elements available for frequency analysis. For example 
if message contains 34 letters then, there are 17 digraph 
substitutions rather than 34 single-letter substitutions.
The cipher-text thus prepared is converted into bits to get 
the final Nw-bit watermark. This step securely encapsulates 
the identity of database’s copyright holder in the form of a 
watermark and acts as first level of protective shield to protect 
the entire embedding process.
Authors used playfair algorithm  for watermark preparation 
to avoid high code complexity. However, note that this can be 
replaced by a stronger encryption scheme such as advanced 
encryption standard (AES) to enhance security. 
3.1.2 Partition Database
This phase creates Np virtual partitions of the database R. The parameter Np is secretly decided by the owner of the database. 
Firstly, derived primary key pk of all the tuples of R is 
calculated individually using Eqn (1) that acts as a substitute 
for the primary key18.
pk = M S B(t.A1)||M S B(t.A2)                                         (1)
where MSb (t.A1) and MSb (t.A2) are the most significant 
bits of two of the candidate attribute in relation R and || is the 
concatenation operator. These candidate attributes are selected 
by owner such that any change in these MSbs will violate 
usability constraints. Further, to defeat linear transformation 
attack, a normalization of these attribute values is carried out 
using a common divider that is applied to all items.
Next, hash of each tuple t ε R is computed using Eqn (2). 
Here, one-way hash functions are used along with key and thus 
are referred as message authentication code (MAC)19. Inclusion 
of key makes partitioning phase more secure. For any tuple t, 
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its hash value6 H(t) is given by: 
H(t)=Hash (Ks||pk||Ks)                                               (2)
where Ks is a secret key selected by owner and || is the 
concatenation operator. Lastly, each tuple t is assigned a 
partition MId. We define partitioning index, Id (t) as:
Id (t) = H(t)mod Np                                                                                            (3)
Depending on hash value of a tuple, its partition is decided. 
Thus, tuples in a partition are out of order. This means any 
two consecutive tuples may or may not be in same partition. 
It is difficult for an attacker to guess the tuple-to-partition 
assignment. This phase acts as a second level of protective 
shield by virtually reordering the tuples before embedding the 
watermark. 
3.1.3 Generate sequence of bit-index parameter
 This step uses cryptographic pseudorandom sequence 
generator (G)19 to generate a sequence of bit-index parameter. 
G is defined as a procedure that maps a random seed to 
pseudorandom string. The random seed is a binary string-based 
on which sequence is generated. G is seeded with the hash of 
the secret key Ks and generates ν where ν={ν1, ν2,….,νNp} is 
set of computationally infeasible sequence of numbers.The 
series of numbers generated by G decides the value of secret 
parameter  for each partition. The output of G is given by 
µ = G (hash (Ks ))                             (4)
Linear feedback shift registers are implemented to 
generate pseudorandom numbers. Since the hash of the key is 
seeded, the generated sequence will be longer enough to satisfy 
the mapping of numbers to points. However, if needed a new 
sequence can be generated using another seed value. Now,  to 
ensure that the value lies within range 1<= vId <= Nw , we 
calculate vId using Eqn (5).
vId = (µId mod Nw )+1                                                                                              (5)
For any tuple tj ε {MId},  vId  is its secret bit-index 
parameter, which tells the index of the watermarking bit to 
be embedded. For each partition, a different vId is calculated. 
The idea is to split database into small groups of tuples such 
that single watermark bit is embedded in each group. Thus, for 
erasing a watermark, an attacker needs to correctly guess the 
secret key Ks selected by the owner of the database and then 
guess the cryptographically generated bit sequence output by 
the G. This security strategy ensures that it is indeed difficult 
for an attacker to correctly guess ν for a particular partition and 
likewise for all partitions of database. Thus, acts as third level 
security shield for the database.
3.1.4 Embed Watermark
This process embeds the prepared watermark W by re-
arranging the tuples partition-wise. The core logic for exchange 
is that if the watermark bit at the selected bit index  is one, all the 
tuples are physically re-arranged in descending order according 
to their hash values calculated using Eqn (2) and vice versa. 
This process continues for the tuples in all the partitions. Since 
the number of watermark bits is very less as compared with 
number of partitions virtually created, each watermark bit is 
embedded multiple times in different partitions depending on {ν}. 
The watermarked relation obtained after embedding of 
watermark is referred as Rw. It may be noted that there is no 
alteration in the database. Since the watermark is embedded 
purely by reordering tuples. Hence, the proposed technique is 
entirely distortion free.
3.2 Watermark Decoder
Let Relation R* defines the maliciously altered 
watermarked relation that the owner receives and successfully 
extracts watermark bits. R* is equivalent to Rw; if not perturbed. 
Figure 2 illustrates various phases in watermark decoder. 
During detection process, the first three phases of watermark 
encoder are followed. Once the database is partitioned and bit-
index parameter {ν} is selected, extract watermark phase is 
executed. 
Figure 2. Various phases of the watermark decoder.
Figure 3.  Algorithm for extracting the watermark from suspected 
watermarked database R*.
3.2.1 Extract Watermark
The algorithm extracts the watermark bits from the 
suspected relation R* as illustrated in Fig. 3.
In the algorithm Extract_Watermark(.) variables count[vId]
[0] and count[vId][1] stores the number of times zero and 
one is extracted for vId watermark bit. It accounts for entire 
watermark length Nw. In a partition, we compare the hash of 
all the tuples in that partition. If more than half of the tuples 
are found to be arranged in descending order according to their 
hash values, bit extracted is one and we increment count[vId]
[1] by one [line 3,4,5]. Else, count[vId][0] is incremented by 
one [line 7]. Similarly all the watermark bits are extracted from 
Np partitions. It may be noted that the process of detecting the 
watermark is blind as it does not require original database R.
  Algorithm: Extract_Watermark(.)
1. Initialize count[1:Nw-1][0]=count[1:Nw-1][1]=0 
2. For each partition MId* εR*do
3. Check the arrangement of all the tuples in MId
* as per 
their hash values.
4. If  hash of majority of tuples in a partition are arranged 
in descending order 
5. count[vId][1]=count[vId][1]+1
6. Else
7. count[vId][0]=count[vId][0]+1
8. End if
9. End for
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3.2.2 Majority Voting
Since each watermark bit is extracted multiple times, 
majority voting is applied to extract the final embedded bits of 
the watermark. Let Ni be number of times the  i
th watermark bit 
is extracted. Considering, number of tuples in database as Nt, 
number of partitions; Np and length of watermark; Nw. Number 
of times each watermark bit is embedded in entire database is 
equal to
 /i p wN N N =                             (6)
For each marked bit bi, we count the number of ones and 
zeros extracted. If fraction obtained by dividing count of ones 
with Ni is greater that detection parameter
3 τ then the extracted 
bit is considered one else zero. The τ detects majority threshold 
and its value lie between 0.5 and 1. If number of ones and zeros 
for a particular bit is zero, then we assign w*[i] = -1 and that 
bit is ignored.
3.3 Comparison with other Existing Techniques
Authors compared their work with two major contributions 
available in literature in watermarking categorical data. 
Sion12 has proposed robust watermarking scheme while 
fragile watermarking technique is proposed by Li13. Authors 
summarises key features in Table 1. 
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION
To perform the experiments authors used OS X version 
10.10.1 with 1.3gHz Intel core i5 processor and 4 gb 1600 
MHz DDR3 RAM. The proposed algorithm has been tested 
and evaluated on a national geochemical survey database 
of the uS20. This data comprises a complete, national-scale 
geochemical coverage of the US and provide context for a 
wide variety of studies in the geological and environmental 
sciences. Database contains 287 attributes of text, numeric and 
categorical data types. Fields characterising soil samples like 
color of the sample, grain size, horizon, medium, geological 
source etc. take finite set values. Such attributes contribute 
to categorical attribute set. There are 59 categorical data 
attributes in the database. We have used MySQL for managing 
the database and PHP for implementation of the algorithm and 
generating test results. 
4.1 Computational Cost
Figure 4 illustrates the experimental results on variation 
of execution times with (a) Data size and (b) Number of 
partitions.  In Fig. 4(a), we observe that the extraction process 
consumes less time as compared with the embedding process. 
The extra time is required to save the reordered tuples back 
into the database. An average of 1million records can be 
watermarked in 6.73 s. 
Proposed Technique Sion 12, et al. Li13, et al. 
Robust watermarking technique is proposed to establish 
ownership.
Robust watermarking technique is 
proposed to establish ownership.
Fragile watermarking technique is proposed 
to ensure integrity of database.
Primary key independence. Technique is applicable to 
databases where Primary key is not defined.
Primary key dependence. Primary key dependence.
Three levels of security
1.   Watermark is cryptographically made secure
      and then embedded.  
2. Secret key- based Data Partitioning. 
3. Secure watermark bit selection. 
Certain tuples are selected for 
embedding watermark.
No security mechanism while inserting 
watermark.
Watermark is selected by the owner – can be signature, 
voice, video etc. representing owner’s identity.
No discussion on watermark. 
Watermark taken as bit stream.
Watermark necessarily created from partition.
Distortion-free technique Altered the database. Distortion-free technique
Highly resilient towards attacks experimental results 
shown in section 4.2.
Less resilient as compared to our 
technique (section 4.2).
Not a robust technique.
Table 1. Qualitative Comparison of proposed technique with Sion12, et al. and Li13, et al.
Figure 4. Execution time dependency on (a)  Data size, Nt (b) 
On number of partitions, Np.
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Figure 4(b) shows results of experiment to check the 
execution time for the combined embedding and extraction 
process by keeping the data size constant at 4600 records 
and varying Np from 15 to 80 partitions. We observe that the 
execution time shows negligible dependency on Np, as also 
expected. 
It may be noted that the embedding process is carried out 
only once before the database is distributed. Similarly, in case 
of ownership disputes, the extraction process is also carried out 
once. Therefore, with proof of ownership as the main goal of 
database protection, the robustness of watermarking is a more 
critical issue than execution times. In the following subsections, 
we illustrate experimental results of tests conducted to prove 
the resilience of our proposed technique against various attacks. 
Table 2 shows the values of various simulation parameters 
used in these experiments. Authors implemented secure hash 
algorithm (SHA-1) for computing hash of the tuple to attain 
better security. It produces 160-bit hash value and is most 
widely used hash algorithm till date.
A robust system should have lower PFM. Assume that Alice is 
the owner of the data set R which is attacked by Mallory an 
attacker. Mallory has no access to R and does not know any of 
the secret information used in embedding. We have imposed 
a three-level security strategy by using secret parameters 
Ks, Np, and ν that makes difficult for an attacker to destroy 
the watermark. We now classify the attacks performed by 
Mallory as subset deletion, subset alteration, subset insertion, 
invertibility, and additive attack as follows. 
Subset Deletion Attack: In this circumvention technique, 
Mallory may delete randomly selected subset of tuples 
of watermarked database with an intention to remove the 
watermark. This will result in loss of tuples from different 
partitions. If some tuples are deleted from a partition, the 
arrangement of other tuples remains same. Hence watermark 
bit is correctly extracted. Even, if there are two tuples left per 
partition, we are able to extract watermark correctly. Thus, 
authors technique is highly resilient towards this attack. 
Another possibility could be tuple deletion attack causes 
deletion of entire partition. However, each bit is embedded 
multiple times into different partitions. Thus, even if one 
partition is deleted; the embedded watermark bit can be 
recovered from other partitions. 
Authors performed the experiment by deleting randomly 
selected tuples of the database. The results are plotted in 
Fig. 5. Experiment has revealed that on deletion of 96 per cent 
of tuples complete watermark is extracted. Even when 99 per 
cent tuples are deleted, 57.14 per cent of watermark is correctly 
extracted. However, in Sion12, et al., on deleting 20 per cent of 
tuples, the extracted watermark is perturbed, which increases 
almost linearly with the attack. At 80 per cent deletions, the 
watermark mismatch is 21 per cent. Thus authors technique is 
more robust and acts as a proof of ownership.
Parameters Symbols Value
Secret key Ks ‘secret’
Tuple count Nt 5000
Partition count Np 50
Watermark length Nw 7
Hash type H SHA-1
Table 2. Simulation parameters
4.2 Robustness Analysis
Authors assessed robustness of the algorithm by evaluating 
probability of false hit and false miss.
4.2.1 False Hit
Authors defined false hit rate PFM as the probability of 
detecting a valid watermark from a non-watermarked relation. 
Lower PFM indicates highly robust system. Let a watermark 
bit bi be embedded Ni times and τ be the detection parameter 
that determines the acceptable majority level. Each extracted 
bit bi
* from a non-watermarked relation has same probability 
of 1/2 to match or not match the original embedded bit in the 
watermark. Thus we define Pbit as the probability that at least 
τ (majority threshold ) portion out of Ni can be detected from 
non-watermarked relation by sheer chance as18
1 1; , ; ,
2 2
i
i
N
bit i i i
j N
P b j N B N N
=τ
   = = τ      ∑           
(7)
For a watermark of length Nw, the false hit rate PFH is 
given by:
 PFM = B (τw; N w, Pbit)                                                     (8)
where τw is watermark length threshold on entire database, Nw 
is length of watermark. Hence, one can improve chances of 
preventing a false hit by selecting higher values of τ as well as 
τw, as the false hit probability reduces substantially. 
4.2.2 False Miss 
Authors defined false miss rate PFM as the probability of 
not detecting a valid watermark from a watermarked relation. 
Figure 5.  Subset deletion attack.
Table 3 shows the effect of Np on the percentage of 
watermark matched on deletion of fraction of tuples from the 
watermarked dataset. At different values of Np, watermark 
is extracted by deleting different percentage of tuples and 
compared with the original embedded watermark. The 
results indicate that when very small number of partitions is 
considered, all the watermark bits are not embedded. Hence 
watermark is not completely extracted. On the contrary, very 
large number of partition results in less number of tuples per 
partition. Thus the probability that entire partition get deleted/
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perturbed increases. Therefore, value of Np is to be carefully 
selected to make system more secure.
Subset Addition Attack: In this attack, Mallory may add 
random tuples to the database with an intention to distort the 
embedded watermark. Added tuples fall to different partitions. 
These added tuples will act as additional noise. Till the number 
of tuples added per partition Nap is less than half of the total 
tuples present in a partition after adding new ones Ntp, the 
correct watermarking bit is extracted. If Nap> ½ (Ntp) then 
extracted bit may differ. However each newly added tuple is 
equally likely to get arranged in same or reverse order. Thus, 
every added tuple may not act as a noise. Practically even 
when Nap> ½ (Ntp) is reached, watermark is not perturbed. In 
addition to this, each bit is embedded repeatedly into different 
partitions. Thus, even if one partition is destroyed, watermark 
bit can be correctly extracted from other. 
Authors performed an experiment by adding random 
tuples to the database. On adding 400 per cent new tuples, the 
watermark extracted is same as watermark embedded. Thus 
the proposed technique is robust against subset addition attack. 
Initially the number of tuples in a partition is in particular 
order and every added tuple would either affect the order or 
it would maintain the order. Therefore, the head start makes it 
practically impossible to affect the order by addition attacks. 
Table 4 summarizes the effect of Np on tuple addition attack. 
For smaller values of Np, all watermark bits are not embedded, 
hence the watermark is not completely extracted. For higher 
values of Np the resilience is 100 per cent.
is 100 per cent resilient towards subset alteration attack which 
is verified experimentally also. However in Sion12,  et.al., 
perturbations in extracted watermark starts at 25 per cent 
data alteration which further increases linearly. At 80 per cent 
data alterations, 28 per cent perturbations exist. Hence, our 
technique is more robust against this attack.
Invertibility Attack: In this attack, Mallory claims 
ownership by finding a key which extracts the embedded 
watermark from pirated relation fortuitously. In proposed 
technique, the probability of success of this attack is lowered 
by setting proper size of secret parameter Ks and watermark 
length Nw. As probability of guessing the Key Ks is 1/(2
|Ks|) and 
watermark is 1/(2|Nw|). by selecting larger values of Ks and length 
of watermark Nw, this probability can be made close to zero. 
Similarly, in order to guess ν, Mallory has to correctly guess 
Ks, which is significantly made larger to avoid this attack.
Additive Attack: In this attack, Mallory embeds her own 
watermark to a watermarked relation and claims the ownership. 
In such case, we propose the same solution as discussed by 
Agrawal2, et.al. Solution is to ask Alice and Mallory to produce 
the original relation into which watermark is embedded. Since, 
Mallory has embedded her watermark in Alice’s watermarked 
database; she will present the pirated relation which contains 
Alice’s watermark.  Alice can extract her watermark from that 
relation and claim ownership while Mallory fails to do so.
Synchronization Error: In the proposed technique, every 
partition contains single watermark bit. Thus, on adding random 
tuples or on deleting tuples randomly, there is no effect on order 
of watermark bits retrieved. Bit index is securely calculated 
independent of tuple addition or deletion attack. Hence, there 
is no synchronization error in the proposed work.  
Tuple Reordering Attack: We can save the order of all 
watermarked tuples and get it registered along with watermark. 
While decoding one can first arrange the tuples in the order 
saved and then extract the watermark. This extra storage space 
is acceptable at the cost of no distortion at all. 
5.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE
Authors proposed a robust watermarking technique 
for relational databases to resolve ownership issues. Major 
contributions of this study:
• The proposed technique watermarks categorical data 
without any perturbations to the dataset.
• Since technique is distortion less, it is suitable for any 
data type attribute such as numeric, non-numeric etc.
• The robust technique resolves ownership issues.
• Primary key independent hash partitioning technique is 
proposed. 
• Three-level security strategy is implemented to make 
technique secure.
• Technique proposed is 400 per cent robust against tuple 
addition attack, 100 per cent against alteration attack and 
96 per cent robust against deletion attacks. 
• The technique is resilient to additive and inevitability 
attacks.
The area of digital watermarking is rife with challenges 
and ample research is still ongoing. Our future research will 
be directed towards increasing the level of resilience against 
Np 0 per 
cent
50 per 
cent
90 per 
cent
95 per 
cent
97 per 
cent
99 per 
cent 
10 85.71 85.71 85.71 85.71 85.71 85.71
30 100 100 100 100 100 42.86
50 100 100 100 100 71.43 57.14
65 100 71.43 57.14 57.14 57.14 57.14
80 100 71.43 57.14 57.14 57.14 57.14
Table 3.  Effect of Np on percentage of watermark matched 
against tuple deletion attack.
Table 4. Effect of Np on percentage of watermark matched 
against tuple addition attack.
Np 0 per 
cent 
50 per 
cent 
100 per 
cent 
200 per 
cent 
300 per 
cent 
400 per 
cent 
10 85.71 85.71 85.71 85.71 85.71 85.71
50 100 100 100 100 100 100
80 100 100 100 100 100 100
Subset Alteration Attack: In this attack Mallory may alter 
certain values in the database to distort the database. In authors 
technique the hash values calculated depends on the derived 
primary key; unless there is a change in this primary key, the 
hash value will not be affected. An attacker can make small 
changes to data within the usability constraints, thus altering 
only the least significant bits of the attributes within a tuple but 
cannot tamper with MSBs. Hence, it will not affect the derived 
primary key and the same partitions will be created. Moreover, 
tuple reordering is based on the hash values generated and 
hence cannot be modified either. Thus the proposed technique 
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several sources of attacks in the watermarking method. 
Additionally, multilevel authentication aspects will be added 
to enhance the security of the proposed technique. 
With the rise in social networking sites, several web 
databases have emerged to resolve problems such as the 
scalability and agility. To name a few ORDbs, OODbs and 
NoSQL databases encompasses different database technologies 
to support a rise in the volume of data stored about users, objects 
and products, the frequency of data accessed, and performance 
and processing needs. Protection against ownership of such 
web databases is the current research challenge.
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